Background
Mental health legislation allowsfor treatment needsto override civil liberty. Mental health review tribunals act asa counterbalance.Thisstudy examines the long-term outcome of patients reviewed by atribunal, and in particular whether the tribunal, in its concern for civil liberty, might be discharging patients prematurely.
Method All non-offender patientsfrom
a defInedcatchmentarea reviewed by the tribunal between the inception ofthe 983
Mental Health Act and 31December 1991
were followed-up until 31May 993.
Results Thosedischarged bythetribunal did notdiffer signifIcantlyfrom those refused discharge in subsequent survival period in the community, in readmission rate or infinaloutcome.
Conclusions Withinthe limitations ofa
non-experimental study, the main hypoth esiswas not supported. An intensive study offamily and personal life in the three months after discharge would cast useful additional light on the soundness oftribunal decisions.
Mental health review tribunals, with the power to revoke compulsory detention, were introduced in the 1959 Mental Health Act. They were subsequently criti cised for not providing enough protection for the patient's civil liberty (Gostin, 1975 Peay (1989) advocated some tightening of the legal procedure, while regarding too rigid an approach as likely to fail. Gostin (1975) has pointed out that a â€˜¿ human right' is no more than an entitle ment. The entitlements of the mentally ill are in some respects opposed. Birley (1991) has remarked that â€oe¿ Every citizen should have the right to be admitted against his or her will, to be treated without loss of dignity, in a first class psychiatric serviceâ€•. There is also the right to liberty and to self determination or autonomy. It has been argued that these rights are not necessarily opposed. 
Survival outsidehospital afterdischarge
This variable is of particular interest, because it might be thought that one way in which â€˜¿ bad' tribunal decisions are revealed is premature readmission after discharge. The â€˜¿ survival' sample was reduced to 1 10 because some patients had left the district immediately on discharge from hospital, and a few remained in hospital for the whole of the study period. Table 3 Other outcomes (both discharged and retainedpatients) psychiatric nursing service, the family doctors and the local family health services association (FHSA).
The survival data were â€˜¿ censored'; that is, the survival period was known only for patients who had been readmitted during the span of the study. The rest of the data were counts; log-linear methods were appro priate for both types of data (Aitkin et al, 1989).
RESULTS
The sample (n=124) consisted of 58 women and 66 men. Two of the patients were detained under Section 41 (541) of the 1983 Mental Health Act and the remaining 122 under Section 2 (52) or Section 3 (53).
Section 2 and 3 patients
Six patients were not discharged during the period of study and six left the district immediately upon discharge; the community phase of the investigation is therefore limited to the remaining 110. The tribunal discharged 42 (34%) of those who had applied.
Subsequentadmissions
Of those discharged after the key tribunal (whether by tribunal or subsequently by RMO or a further tribunal), 51% were readmitted during the remainder of the follow-up period. The number of subse quent admissions is shown in Table 1 .
The analysis took account of two other factors. First, the proportion of the follow up period spent out of hospital. Second, the number of days at risk of readmission, that
Readmissions (n) Yes No
Yes No is the number of days each patient spent outside hospital during the study period. The effect of the latter was determined after allowing for the effect of the former. None of the variables studied â€"¿ gender, age, civil status, diagnosis, section type or tribunal decision â€"¿ had any significant association with readmission rate.
Timespentin hospital afterreview
Those patients who were not discharged by the key tribunal remained thenceforth continuously in hospital for a mean of 14.4 months (median 2.52 months).
Significant clinical eventsin the sixmonths following a tribunalhearing
Twenty-six of the 124 patients remained in hospital continuously for at least six months after their key tribunal hearing. Of the remaining 98, 27 were readmitted in this six-month period: one after a suicide attempt, and two after violence to others. One patient, who was not readmitted, assaulted his brother with a baseball bat a few days after discharge by a tribunal.
Circumstances at follow-update
These circumstances are multifarious and not mutually exclusive. To get a general view, five mutually exclusive categories were constructed: (1) known to be dead; (2) left the catchment area; living in the catchment area in (3) private accommodation (4) community homes or (5) long-stay psychia tric wards. The data are shown in Table 2 . There was no evidence of an association between tribunal decision and outcome An exponential distribution was used initially, but gave a bad fit. The reason is apparent in Figure 1: 
Section 41 patients
There were two 541 patients, a male and a female. Both were conditionally discharged. At follow-up the male was living in a group home and the female had died, aged 44, from thromboembolic disease.
DISCUSSION

Aspects of the analyses
In one sensetribunalsare a treatment,that is a deliberate measure which affects the welfare of the patient. Unfortunately, the most powerful way of investigating treat ments and their modifications, the random ised clinical trial, is out of keeping with judicial function. Thus the outcome of any change in tribunal policy or procedure can be assessed only by observation, not by experiment, with the weakness,as in this investigation, that the factors under study and the outcome cannot confidently be causally linked.
One purpose of the study was to determinewhether or not those discharged by the tribunal were more vulnerable than those not discharged. Because it is readily available, the number of subsequent re admissionsis an attractive general index of vulnerability. Nevertheless, it posed an analytic problem. Ordinarily a risk factor is required to be assessed against the duration of exposure to the risk, in this case time spent outside hospital between key discharge and the end of the follow-up period. However, this duration at risk cannot be regarded as a passive variable because the proportion of total time outside hospital is itself a factor measuring vulnerability. For this reason the effect of duration at risk was assessed after allowance was made for proportion of total time spent outside hospital. The failure to find evidence of early readmission of patients discharged by the tribunal suggests that, on this criterion, its judgement was sound. However, it cannot be excluded that readmission was occasion ally deterred by the tribunal's decision. The tribunal is seen as an august body. Its decision to discharge may suggest to the general practitioner that the initial decision to admit was wrong and make him reluctant to ask for readmission. Even if he does ask, the psychiatrist may demur at compulsory admission too soon after discharge if there are no new clinical developments. First, proof is conclusive evidence of a fact. But a tribunal, unlike a criminal court, does not strive to establish a fact, but to reach judgements on complex and some times contradictory clinical matters. Even where the Act appears nearest (in calling for a dichotomous judgement) to requiring proof â€oe¿ he is not then suffering from mental disorderâ€•,(572) the appearance is misleading because mental disorder is not a fact, but a concept with unstated bound aries. However, this clause in the Act is not itself critical because in terms of the onus placed on the patient it can be overruled by the less stringent requirement â€oe¿ mental disorder of a nature or degree . . .â€oe (S72).
Biases thought to put patients at a disadvantage
Second, the Act states the kernel propo sitions in the negative form â€oe¿ not then suffering; detention . . . not justified; not necessaryâ€•. Individual tribunal members might think in the more natural affirmative form, and then discipline themselves to deliver their conclusion in the negative form as required by the Act. There can be no control over their thoughts. If, therefore, their conclusion is influenced by the form in which they think, affirmative or negative, there is cognitive rather than legal bias. It is not known to what extent the asymmetrical wording of the Act survives, to influence the conclusion, all the complex weighings and deliberations required by the uncertain nature of the topic matter.
Risks to self or others
These considerations aside, there may be larger biasesoperating against the patient. Peay (1989) believes that tribunals are too swayed by the RMO's views and by the possibility that the patient might harm himself or others (â€oeIn the interests of his own . . . safety or with a view to the protection of other personsâ€• S72(a&b) ii). Protection of others can be interpreted broadly to include the emotional welfare of others (Jones, 1994). The usual concern, however, is the spectre of serious physical harm to self or to others and, in particular, the risk of suicide. These risks are difficult to assess, patti cularly in a mechanised society in which psychiatric patients are accustomed to drive cars. What is an acceptable risk? The 1983 Act wisely avoids comment. The nearest it ventures is when disallowing discharge by the nearest relative if the RMO judges the risk to be â€oe¿ likelyâ€• (525).Likely,in commonusage, means greater than evens. However, there is a logical principle that the more dire the possible consequences, the smaller the accep table risk. There is also an illogical belief that the more dire these consequences the greater the actual risk, phobic reasoning from which tribunals and RMOs may not be exempt. There are instances of individual patients in whom the risk is so great that refined debate is a formality; Lord Platt reflected in a different context that he did not need a discriminant function to recognise a pear tree. For many patients, however, the most that can be said is that the clinical and social indices place them in a group with a high relative (but still a low absolute) risk. Thus, there are patients who would not commit suicide but whom tribu nals do not discharge; they are denied their liberty, not because of themselves but, statistically speaking, because of the company they keep.
Possible Improvements Peay (1989) believes that â€˜¿ improvement' in tribunals might be limited to a more systematic and rigorous application of the law and some changes in procedure. Wood (1995) emphasises the value of a tribunal in encouraging constructive dialogue between the patients and their representatives, and the doctors and social workers, and sees this element as important in any future reform. Ultimately major advances in reconciling patients' right to be treated and their civil rights are likely to come from sources outside the tribunal: more tolerance and better care in the community; psychiatric hospitals with improved conditions, but, above all, safe antipsychotic drugs which patients are willing to take becausethey do not rob them of their sense of well-being. (McCreadie et a!, 1992) .
One possible improvement would be to define more clearly what is expectedof the professional participants. Patients' represen tatives (usually lawyers) might be influenced by the need to â€oe¿ sustain their own credibility in front of the tribunalâ€•(Peay, 1989). The tribunal is not a court (although treated so for the consideration of contempt) and the participants should not have to regard its decision as a reflection on their competence or credibility. This is particularly so since, except in rare circumstances, its decision cannot be regarded as either right or wrong. Tribunal Rule 22 encourages informality. The RMO might reasonably expect to be pressed hard, both by members of the tribunal and the patient's legal representa tive, on the evidence for mental disorder, the reliability of that evidence, the case for continued treatment or assessment,and the risk to the patient or others of discharge, on the reasons, in short, why he has not discharged the patient under Section 23 of the Act. It is less conducive to informality if the RMO has to answer under cross examination by the patient's legal represen tative specimen and hypothetical questions not primarily intended to establish facts but points of law. Such questions may lead to RMOs overstating their views and, while wishing only to explain why they have not discharged the patient, appearing instead uncompromisingly to oppose the patient's civil liberty. The tribunal might also be tempted to press the RMO on points of law, for instance whether in his or her view various parts of Section 72 are satisfied. to a patient that their discharge did not in any way imply that their detention hitherto had been misjudged or unlawful. Any similar misconceptions general practitioners mighthavecouldbe dispelledby a comment in the discharge summary.
Whether any such changes, however modest, might be beneficial could only be judged against consequences. Any serious examination would need to be on a large scale, and thus probably confined to the first three months following discharge. Harm to self or others, extent of compliance with the care plan and readmission have the advan tage of being objective and easily accessible variables. The impact on relatives who are forced to be carers could be accessedby the keyworker. It is an important item because, if rights are entitlements (Gostin, 1975) , then relatives have the right not to have the quality of their lives impoverished by the burden of care and worry which should properly be borne by a hospital; it is in any casein the interestsof the patients' health that they be cared for by those whose own health is not imperilled by the demands of providing that care.
